Magyar
A RUSYN MEMORANDUM
SUBCARPATHIA
In The Center of Pan-Slavic Aspirations
By: Mihály Pazuhánics-Páncélos
Leader of the Freedom Movement of Subcarpathia.
Ruthenian life in Hungary until 1918.
The core of the Ruthenian people settled in North-Eastern Hungary, the present day Subcarpathia, at the end of the 14th century. Originally they lived around Lake Ilmen, which is located 200 kilometers South of Saint Petersburg, and which region belonged to the Lithuanian Principality. The people were called Russ, – Rutheni in Latin – which means rafts men in the ancient Lithuanian language. The memories of life on the water, the tradition of rafting survived among the people until the most recent times, and even in the past decades they transported the wood exploited in the forests of the Carpathian Mountains on rafts to the Hungarian Great Plain.
Ruthenian life in Hungary starts with the name of Todor Koriatovics. Because of his aspirations for independence, this Podolian prince was put in prison by his cousin, Lithuanian grand prince Vitold, in 1395. Koriatovics fled to Hungary in 1397, after he was released (or escaped?) from prison. Hungarian king Zsigmond (Sigismund) admits him and donates the castle of Munkács and the surrounding region to him and his people, who followed their prince from Podolia. Out of gratitude, because his people received not only refuge and a new homeland, but also land and equal rights to those of the Hungarians, Koriatovics built a monastery for the St. Balil-Order North of Munkács on the Csernek Mountain an elevation at the shore of the river Latorca.
During the following centuries more groups left the ancient homeland at Lake Ilmen and moved south. They first settled in Galicia which was Polish territory at that time, but because of Polish persecutions they fled further, crossed the Carpathian-Mountains and joined the Ruthenians already living there. This is how the present day Ruthenian habitation was formed from the River Poprád to the flow of the Upper Tisza River. An absolute compliance developed between the Ruthenians and the native Hungarians already living there. The Ruthenian people took upon themselves the common fate with the Hungarians completely. We find them at the side of the Hungarians in the national freedom fights, especially during the uprising of Ferenc Rákóczi II, for which they received from the reigning prince the deserved appellation “charissima et fidelissima natio”, and “gens fidelissima”. The figure of Rákóczi is still very much alive in the memory, legends and anecdotes of the Ruthenian people. When in 1848 some ethnic groups of Hungary turned against the Hungarians as a consequence of the intrigues of Vienna, the anti-Hungarian instigation did not find an echo among the Ruthenian people; neither did these people vacillate in their loyalty to the Hungarians, when the Russian army crossed the Carpathian mountains to subdue the Hungarian freedom fight in alliance with the Austrian Emperor in 1849.
Naturally the national awakening of the 19th century also took place among the Ruthenes, but contrary to the other ethnic groups in Hungary, the Ruthenian nationalism did not push over to the realm of political power, but remained at cultural levels. The main representative of this Ruthenian cultural nationalism was Alexander Duhnovits (1803-1865), author of the Ruthenian national anthem. His most famous national poem is: “I was, I am and I shall be a Ruthenian…” In 1853 he also wrote the first Ruthenian grammar. He sent the manuscript to János Rakovszky in Buda to be printed at the University Press. Rakovszky, however, gave the manuscript to Vajtkovszki, the Russian priest at Üröm, who rewrote it arbitrarily and converted it to a Russian grammar. This is the explanation, why the language of the emerging Ruthenian literature is most similar to the Russian.
The Greek (Byzantine rite) Catholic church, using the Ruthenian language, played a large role in the cultural life of the Ruthenian people. The union of the Ruthenian church took place in 1649, and became final with the organization of the Greek-Catholic Episcopacy of Munkács in 1660. Originally it was subordinated to the archbishopry of Eger, then in 1771 Queen Maria Tereza subordinated it directly to the primate of Esztergom. This step, taken by Maria Tereza, assured the most complete independence to the Greek-Catholic episcopacy of Munkács, which in time transferred its seat to Ungvár, and simultaneously incorporated the whole territory inhabited by Ruthenes: 823 pure Ruthenian villages and 499 villages with mixed population, with 858 parishes and 690 priests (Kamil Krofta: Dejiny ceskoslovenské, p. 508). The Greek-Catholic church promoted the Ruthenian language and culture, and made the development of the first higher Ruthenian culture possible. The Greek-Catholic Church maintained its leading role in Ruthenian cultural life until most recent times, because the Hungarian ethnic law of education of 1868 recognized the right of the churches to maintain schools and they also had the right to choose the language of teaching themselves. The Greek-Catholic church made it possible to preserve the Ruthenian language and culture, but at the same time, precisely its Catholicism and the most Hungarian friendly behavior of the Greek-Catholic clergy excluded, from the very start, that any outside power and alien influence could succeed in guiding the spirit of the Ruthenian people.
This is the reason why the effort of Ukrainization by the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church of Galicia remained completely without any echo in Hungary and the Great-Russian pan-slavic movement, which started at the eve of World War I., couldn’t show much results either, which movement wanted to overthrow the Greek Catholic Church and prepare politically its plan to break up the Monarchy and occupy the Danube Basin through the propagation of pravoslavia. “It is certain that this instigation was organized and financed by Russia and did not originate in the soul of the people and hardly woke any echo in it” – wrote Macartney in this connection in his work “Hungary and her successors” (p. 201) “Despite the Russian and Ukrainian propaganda competing with each other, the Ruthenian peasant remained Ruthenian, actually more distinctly Ruthenian. There was no Ruthenian national party and they did not wish one. The intelligence and middle class, if there was one, didn’t resist, moreover it greeted the opportunity to become Hungarianized” – writes Macartney.
How was Subcarpathia annexed to Czechoslovakia?
The goal of Russian czarist imperialism to occupy the territory of Subcarpathia and through it the whole Danube-Basin, failed as a consequence of their 1914-15 military defeat, and the revolution of 1917. One year later, in autumn 1918, when the military defeat of the Central Powers was obvious, unexpectedly a new claimant to the territory of Subcarpathia appeared, Czechoslovakia, which state was created at that time as the result of the propaganda of Masaryk and Benes.
In 1915, in his memorandum to the Allies (Entente-Powers) Masaryk, the Central-European representative of the Pan-Slavic aspiration, wanted to put a Russian Grand Duke onto the Czech throne and expected the newly created Czech state to be incorporated into the Russian sphere of interest, by the Russian Empire which also wanted to annex Subcarpathia. In 1918, however, after czarist Russia collapsed, Masaryk asked the Western Powers to give Subcarpathia – based on the principle of democracy and self-government – to the Czechs, the “real representatives” of Central-European democracy. In reality, for Masaryk, who concealed himself behind the humanist mask, czarist absolutism, western democracy, or Russian Bolshevism were only tools with which he could realize his real goal, the great consolidation of the Slavic people, the Pan-Slavic unity. “At the peace conference we asked for Subcarpathia, obligating ourselves to give her autonomy, because this was the only possibility to solve the question of the Ruthenes of Hungary within the Slavic program and in the spirit of Slavic unity” – says Benes in his book “Ou vont les Slaves” (p. 190). To this statement he immediately adds: “As to the final destiny of this territory, we make it dependable from what happens to East-Galicia, that is Czechoslovakia wanted to take possession of this territory only until she could hand it over to Russia, the supreme representative of the Pan-Slavic unity, as she wanted to do already in 1920 and as she did in 1945.” To save for Russia, falling into the anarchy of the communist revolution, the strategically extremely important Subcarpathia, the road leading to the Danube-Basin and the Adriatic Sea, and all this with the help of the western powers in the name of democracy and based on the principle of self-government of the people! This was the wish of the Czech state-organizers in the autumn of 1918.
Masaryk, to comply at least formally with Wilson’s principle of ethnic self-government, became acquainted with Grigorij Zsatkovics, a lawyer born in Subcarpathia and employed by General Motors, through American senator Smith, director of General Motors. Masaryk could persuade Zsatkovics, as one who immigrated from the territory of Subcarpathia, but was already an American citizen, to organize a Ruthenian National Council made up of Ruthenes, and in the name of this council representing the Ruthenian people, naturally without asking them, to enter into a pact with him, respectively with Czechoslovakia yet to be established, about uniting the territory of Subcarpathia with Czechoslovakia. In return he offered the position of governor of Subcarpathia to Zsatkovics.
Zsatkovics, without having the slightest knowledge about the real situation in Subcarpathia, dared to undertake this adventurous assignment, which promised him a brilliant future. In July 1918, a small Ruthenian group came together in Homestead (U.S.A.) under his leadership, and pronounced, that they demand complete independence for the people of Subcarpathia, or the possibility to get united with the Galician and Bukovinian Slavs, or, if this would not be possible, they would ask for self-government within any country, maybe even within Hungary.
In October of 1918 Zsatkovics formally founded the National Council of the American Ruthenes, and on October 21, he handed over the triple resolution, accepted in Homestead, to President Wilson. As Wilson was informed, in advance, by his brother in law Masaryk about the memorandum to be presented to him by the delegation, Wilson immediately warned Zsatkovics, that only the third point could be taken into consideration, and therefore he suggests, that he should enter into negotiations with the Czechs without delay. The negotiations started on October 25, and already the next day, on the 26th of October Masaryk and Zsatkovics signed the Philadelphia Agreement, according to which Masaryk committed himself, that the Ruthenian people of Subcarpathia will get self-government if they unite with Czechoslovakia and the borders of self-government, within Czechoslovakia, will be drawn according to the wishes of the Ruthenian people.
On the 12th of November, based on this agreement, the National Council of the American Ruthenes came together in Scranton (U.S.A.) and declared the unification of the Ruthenian territories with Czechoslovakia, on condition, that the Autonomous Ruthenian State will also incorporate the western territories which partly became Slovakized already. The Ruthenian people of Subcarpathia didn’t know anything about the activities of Masaryk and Zsatkovics, and they had no idea, that their fate was already sealed without their knowledge and against their will, because the will of the Ruthenian people was completely different.
Though, following the communist Revolution in Budapest, on the 9th of November of 1918 a Ruthenian National Council was formed at Lubovna, the western region of Subcarpathia, which, based on the right of self-government, wanted to be separated from Hungary and work together with the Slovak National Council, but on the following day already, another National Council was formed at Ungvár, behind which the majority of the Ruthenian people lined up, and this National Council of Ungvár denounced all separatist aspirations and asked for such a self-government for the Ruthenes within Hungary, as was enjoyed by Croatia and Slavonia. Soon negotiations started with the government of the Hungarian Republic and as a result of these, on the 24th of December of 1918, the Hungarian Government issued the 10th ethnic law of 1918, which guaranteed self-government for Subcarpathia to the fullest degree. According to this law the districts of Mármaros, Ugocsa, Bereg and Ung, inhabited by Ruthenes are united into one single administrative unity: Russka Krajna, which enjoys complete autonomy in regard of religion, education, cultural matters, internal administration and jurisdiction. Common affairs are: foreign affairs, military affairs/national defense, monetary affairs, civil and criminal law, transportation and economic affairs. Legislative bodies are: the Ruthenian National Assembly and the Hungarian Parliament. The head of the administration is the Secretary of Russka-Krajna, who is responsible to both legislative bodies, while in Subcarpathia there is a governor residing. Dr. Oreszt Szabó was immediately appointed as the first governor.
Hardly two weeks went by, when on January 13, 1919, the Czech occupying forces took possession of Ungvár. From this time on they applied great pressure onto the Ruthenian Autonomy, which started to operate with the leadership of Dr. Oreszt Szabó, to make them break up with Hungary and unite with Czechoslovakia. However the leaders of the Ruthenian Self-Government denied the demand consistently and remained with Hungary. In March 1919 they the Ruthenian National Assembly held elections, and the National Assembly met already during the month of March. However, in the meantime the communists took power in Budapest, and when the communist government tried to get hold of Subcarpathia by sending there communist agitators Henrik Morgenstern and Géza Bálir (Blau), natives of Subcarpathia, the Czech army crossed the line of the Ung, and on March 31st occupied Ungvár for a second time and by advancing toward Munkács came in contact with the Rumanian army, which took possession of the eastern part of Subcarpathia which was unoccupied until then. With the total military occupation of Subcarpathia the possibility was given to carry out the aggressive Czech plans. The glorious enforcement was executed by the French general Paris, a Foreign Legionary, who was commanding the Czech Legion. At the end of April, he received telegraphic directives from the French minister president Clémenceau: “Subcarpathia has to be annexed to Czechoslovakia immediately.”
The antecedents to the telegraphic command of Clémenceau are briefly the following: In February 1919, Zsatkovics arrived in Paris with Beszkid, the anti-Hungarian leader of the Ruthenian International Council, who moved from Lubovna to Eperjes, and together they organized a head-committee representing all Ruthenes. At the intervention of Benes this head-committee was seen soon by American colonel House and French delegate Tardieu and as proposed by these two, the most supreme five-member council of the peace conference made their decision in the case of Subcarpathia in accordance with the Czechoslovak solution on March 3rd, 1919.
Colonel Paris, in possession of Clémenceau’s telegram sent for Kaminszky, an ex-lawyer from Ungvár (who lived also in France for a year and, because of his knowledge of the French language, became the main adviser to Paris, and who, furthermore, being suspected to be a Russian spy, was interned between 1914-1917), who advised to also draw into counsel landowner Alexej Beszkid, the leader of the Ruthenian National Council at Eperjes, and Szabolcs Kávássy and ex-bailiff (who played a leading role in forcing back the Polish legion when entering through the Pass of Verecke), and the trio appointed those 120 Sub-Carpathians, of whom, at the order of General Paris, the new National Council had to be formed, which had to work together with the Czechs from then on. On the morning of May 4, 1919, at the order of General Paris, the members of the Council, appointed this way, were assembled by military force into the gymnasium of the High School of Ungvár, without them knowing why they had to appear. They found out only when teacher Lichy, an envoy of the government of Prague, informed them, that they came together, because as representatives of the Ruthenian people, they had to declare the “voluntary” unification with Czechoslovakia. The forcefully brought in “representatives” became so angry because of this announcement, that they threw the objects at hand – bones, food rests – at teacher Lichy, in consequence of which Lichy had to escape through the window. Then General Paris, by using military force, made them sign the sheets, pronouncing the “voluntary” unification.
Barely two weeks before the “voluntary union”, President Masaryk turned to the people of Subcarpathia in a heart-rending proclamation, – which the local authorities made public through posters in Czech language, – and in which he said among others: “Based on the holy right of the people’s self-government you will decide about your destiny yourself, my dear brothers. The Czechoslovakian military units have no right to influence your decision, on the contrary, it is their duty to respect your decision.” (Béla Illés: Karpatska Rapsodie, p. 398). – Lo and behold, this was how the solemn promises of President Masaryk were kept in the Czech democracy! With this the destiny of Subcarpathia was fulfilled, the peace treaties of Trianon and Saint Germain only reinforced this verdict.
The fate of the Ruthenian people in Czechoslovakia
In article 10 of the peace treaty of Saint Germain Czechoslovakia committed herself to create an autonomous Ruthenian territory between the borders drawn in the peace treaty. The Czechoslovakian government by no means thought to enact the essence of the obligation taken upon herself in the peace treaty, the most she strived for was a technical solution. Therefore, on April 26, 1920, Grigor Zsatkovics was named governor of Podkarpadská Russ in acknowledgement of his merits. However, at that time Zsatkovics was already clearly aware of the real intention of the Czechs. He made an attempt to make the Czech government keep its obligations pledged to him and bound by the peace treaty, but after his efforts in this direction failed, he resigned from his post on March 13, 1921, which Prague accepted on May 16th of the same year. Zsatkovics then returned to the United States disappointed. Because he felt, that he was heavily responsible for the destiny turning unfavorable for the Ruthenian people, he wrote a report for his self-justification, in which he disclosed to the American Ruthenian public his ineffective efforts to assure Ruthenian self-government, after he returned to America.
The American Ruthenians were greatly shocked about the contents of the report and at the congress held in Pittsburgh on November 26, 1922, the attending 1500 (onethousandfivehundred) delegates founded the Rusyn Council of National Defense as the sole representative of the American Ruthenes and with the goal to fight for the rights of the Ruthenians in the homeland. The same Ruthenes, who played such a large role in the annexation of Subcarpathia to Czechoslovakia, now started to bombard the Czechoslovakian Government and the international public opinion with memorandums to coerce Ruthenian Self-Government. During this fight they turned to the Czechoslovakian regime with a memorandum in 1923. Their intervention was rejected by the Czechoslovakian government with the argument, that the self-government of Subcarpathia is an internal affair of Czechoslovakia, and American citizens have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of Czechoslovakia. In 1918 Masaryk and the Czech agents were of exactly the opposite opinion. Naturally, because at that time it was useful for them to acknowledge the right of self-government of the Carpathian-Ruthenes, – stated bitterly Michael Yuhasz Sr., the president of the Rusyn Council of National Defense, in his book “Wilson’s Principles in Czechoslovak Practice” (Homestead, Pa, 1929, p. 8). In 1925, the Carpathian-Ruthene Congress, held in New York, protested again by way of resolution against the fact that the declarations of the peace treaty were not kept, and warned the Czechoslovakian government, that if it doesn’t grant self-government to Subcarpathia, the American Ruthenes will use different ways and means to guarantee the rights of the Ruthenian people.
In September of 1928 the Rusyn Council of National Defense was not content anymore with sending protests and objections to the Czechoslovakian government, but turned directly to the powers who signed the peace treaty of Saint Germain and called their attention to the behavior of the Czechoslovakian regime. In autumn of 1928, when the American consulates of Czechoslovakia invited also the American Ruthenes to the official festivities held to celebrate the tenth anniversary of Czechoslovakia’s existence, the Rusyn Council of National Defense turned to the Ruthenian public institutions of America with a declaratory resolution, accepted by 160 Ruthenian communities. The declaratory resolution says among others: “The American Ruthenes protest against the tyrannical and anti-autonomous policy of the Czechoslovakian Government and authorize Mr. Michael Yuhasz, president of the Rusyn Council of National Defense to protest together with the leaders of the Council in the name of the American Ruthenian people. The American Ruthenes feel that they are responsible for the annexation of Subcarpathia to the Republic of Czechoslovakia,… as a result of which the Czechoslovakian Government is now digging the grave of this people, denationalizes its language and literature and its aim is the total annihilation of the people. The Council is authorized to do everything possible that the Carpathian-Rusyn people gain back, as soon as possible, its freedom, justified and rightful borders, as well as self-government according to the peace treaty.” (Michael Yuhasz, Sr., Wilson’s Principles in Czechoslovak Practice, p. 59.).
However, not only the American Ruthenes, who played such an important role in the annexation of Subcarpathia to Czechoslovakia, raised a protest against the Czechs who did not keep their promises and their obligations accepted in the peace treaty, but also the spokesmen of the Ruthenes in the homeland. Therefore on August 21, 1928, András Kurtyák explained in his memorandum to the People’s Alliance, that the Czechs not only broke the sanctity of the given word, but also article ten of the treaty of Saint Germain and the respective regulations of the constitution. The Ruthenian people was divided territorially. 200,000 Ruthenians, living west of the river Ung, were thrown to Slovak chauvinism. 80% of the officials are Czech, who can’t speak one word in Ruthenian. 40 000 Czech officials, gendarmerie and police occupied Subcarpathia to subdue every movement in its bud. The most blatant example of the selfish, greedy and imperialistic Czech politics is how the land-reform was carried out. From the distributed 260 115 acres of land the natives received only 19 999 acres. In the entirely Hungarian village of Bátyu, for example the Czech settlers received several hundred acres while the original population got only two – for a cemetery.
The grievances of the Ruthenes of Subcarpathia against the politics of the Czech regime can be summarized according to the following:
1. The Czech regime did not give self-government to the peoples of Subcarpathia, although it was promised in the agreement made with Zsatkovics and assumed obligation in the peace treaty of Saint Germain.
2. The Czech regime, did not settle the border question of western Subcarpathia either, and because of this it excluded automatically 200 000 Ruthenians from the independent life of Subcarpathia.
3. Czechs were placed at the head of the administration and police, while overlooking the original inhabitants, Subcarpathia was flooded by Czech officials and police, and especially in the southern region, inhabited by Hungarians, Czech settlements were created neglecting and harming the native population.
4. Beside the education-politics of going back and for between the Ukrainian and Great-Russian aim, the Czechoslovak regime pursued more and more openly a policy to Czechize (convert the people to become Czechs).
5. The Czech regime exploited and heavily endangered the economic growth of the people of Subcarpathia with its economic policy, the ruthless exploitation and destruction of the Sub-Carpathian forests by throwing them mainly to the mercy of foreign capitalist groups.
While, with the directive of the Rusyn Council of National Defense, the organization of the American Ruthenes pressed mainly for the reparation of the first two grievances, the most important goal of the Ruthenes of the homeland was to eliminate the last three grievances.
Subsequently we want to make known these grievances above all, because these latter grievances explain why the Czech regime was not willing to fulfill its obligation regarding Ruthenian self-government.
Administrative oppression. – At the time when Czechoslovakia overtook the territory of Subcarpathia, there was not one Czech person living there. In spite of this, in 1935, the officials leading the top and middle administrative positions were of the following nationality (see table below):
However not only in the central administration, but in every sector of the state government, consequently in provincial assignments, the Czechs were in the leading positions. According to the following (see table below):
As a consequence of this administrative oppression the local Ruthenian and Hungarian middle class was slowly ousted completely from the administration, not only from the leading positions but also from those which require less qualifications. Their place was taken by Czechs, who had only one goal: to get rich as soon as possible and then return wealthy to the Czech or Moravian fatherland. These Czech officials and government employees considered Subcarpathia only as a colonial territory to be looted, they disregarded and looked down at the people of Subcarpathia. It is understandable they only provoked hatred against themselves. This hatred was even more fueled by the circumstance, that while they plunged the Ruthenian and Hungarian population into the worst poverty and crippled them with heavy taxes, they built a luxury settlement for the foreign civil servant settlers at Ungvár, the capital of Subcarpathia, naturally from the taxes of the despised and cheated natives. Ungvár’s city-quarter called Galagó is a blatant proof of the policy of the Czech colonization of and segregation from the native inhabitants.
The central Czech government not only filled the offices of Subcarpathia with Czech colonists, but as a consequence of the land-reform executed on the most fertile flatland, the majority of the distributed properties went to Czech settlers, and the Hungarians living there were cheated out of everything. As a consequence, in the vicinity of every larger Hungarian village a Czech settlers’ colony was built, and the houses, the complete agricultural equipment and animals for the Czech settlers were provided by the state. This is how next to Bátyu Svoboda, to Bótrágy Nova-Botrágy, to Mezőkaszony Somkosino etc. was born.
Fight against the Ruthenian consciousness. – The circumstance, that in large the Ruthenian inhabitants accepted the Czech “liberators” with antipathy, and the majority of them remained loyal to Hungary, determined the direction of the Czech culture policy in Subcarpathia from the very beginning. The purpose of this policy was to alienate the Ruthenes from the Hungarians, and replace the Ruthenian consciousness with Ukrainian or Russian awareness, and finally to Czechize openly. The culture policy, one and the same in its final aim, but using confused and indefinite means lead to a complete chaos in the spiritual and linguistic area and ultimately also on political ground, and caused total national disintegration and internal deterioration.
In the beginning the Czechs supported the Ukrainian line, because they considered Subcarpathia as a temporary possession and wanted to hand it over to the Great Russian Empire at the first possible chance. To prepare the implementation of this plan, it seemed most adequate to assimilate the Ruthenes to the Ukrainians living north of the Carpathian Mountains.
However, when in the spring of 1921 the Serb Greek-Orthodox patriarch arrived in Yugoslavia with the ruins of the Wrangel army, he appointed Subcarpathia as the field of operation for 300 Orthodox clergy men, the Czechoslovak Government accepted these 300 clerics and sent them to Subcarpathia, because they thought that by reinforcing the pravoslav church there, the influence of the Hungarian friendly Greek Catholic church will diminish and cause a split among the Ruthenes in the religious sector too. The Czech regime wasn’t disappointed in its expectation. The Orthodox clergy wanted to be grateful to the Czech regime for its hospitality and started its fight against Greek Catholicism (Byzantine Rite) with all the hatred of the Orthodoxy. In its warfare it had always the help of the official state apparatus on its side and one after the other they took away the churches, schools and even the famous Bazilitan monastery of Csermekhegy founded by Todor Koriatovics. When, after several years the Greek Catholics could get back, by way of judicial proceedings, some of their taken churches and schools, the Pravoslavs received state funding so they could build their own churches. In many places the state administration put pressure on the inhabitants in favor of the Pravoslavia and made the conversion attractive with financial allowances. The official Czech regime backed the pravoslavization to the utmost, which resulted in the division of the Ruthenes in the field of religion. While in 1910 there lived 386,812 Greek Catholics and only 577 Pravoslavs in Subcarpathia, by 1930 the number of Greek Catholics was reduced to 359,166 and that of the Pravoslavs raised to 112,034. Because of the Czech cultural policy the East crossed the Carpathian Mountains religion-wise already in the 1930’s.
It seemed, that the Great-Russian trend is already victorious in Subcarpathia, when in 1924 another new emigration appeared in Czechoslovakia: the Ukrainians of East-Galicia who lost their battle with the Poles. Because the Czech-Polish relation was not the most friendly, the Czech regime embraced these newcomers and sent a large part of the Ukrainian emigrants to Subcarpathia to annoy the Poles and to irritate them with the Ukrainian irredenta from there. The Ukrainian teachers, educators, clergy and administrative people which came to Subcarpathia, made it their program to Ukrainisize the Ruthenians, and to make Subcarpathia the Piermont of Ukrainian liberation. They turned as well against the Ruthenes loyal to their old traditions and their characteristic ethnic individuality, as against the Great-Russian trend which constantly gained terrain through the Pravoslavia. Their main propagandistic tool was the cultural league named Prosvita, which stood in sharp confrontation with Dom Duhnovics’s Russian disposition. This Ukrainian-Russian cultural confrontation came in very handy for the Czechs, because it diverted the attention from the main political question, the self-government of Subcarpathia, the final verification of the western borders of Subcarpathia, while at the same time the strength of the Ruthenes was destroyed and the Ruthenes were not only set against each other in the field of religion, but also culturally, nationally and politically.
At the beginning of the thirties, when the general foreign policy urged the Czech regime to approach the Polish Government, one condition of rapprochement was to moderate and set aside completely the already too loud Ukrainian propagandistic activity. At this time the possibility arose in some leading Czech circles, that perhaps opposite to the Russian and Ukrainian trend the old Ruthenian trend, based on local traditions, should be reinforced, all the more, because the new generation doesn’t have an immediate Hungarian relationship and therefore they don’t have to be afraid of the renewal of a Hungarian friendly trend, or there is even the possibility to lead the Ruthenian elements onto Czech waters. From this time on, to counterbalance the Russian and Ukrainian trend, the official Czech cultural policy aimed to raise the number of Czech schools in an even larger degree as the invasion of the Czech settlers would have given grounds for.
While in 1920-21 they had 4 nurseries, 22 elementary schools and 1 middle school (higher elementary school) in Subcarpathia, in 1931-32 the number of schools using the Czech language were as follows: 43 nurseries, 158 elementary schools, 14 middle schools as well as 3 high schools and a teacher’s training college with a parallel Czech branch. Although the Czech settlers made up only 5% of the total population of Subcarpathia, they had much more schools than the Hungarians or the Ruthenian themselves. In 1931-32 for example there was an elementary school in Czech language for every 212 Czech inhabitants, while at the same time 945 Hungarians and 998 Ruthenes had only one elementary school in their own language. In this same year in the middle schools they had 61 classes in Czech language for 448 students of the Czech mother tongue. The aim is clear: however few the Czech students are, Czech schools are opened, and subsequently they are filled with non-Czech students through different favors or sometimes with force, to turn them into Czechs. They explained this to be necessary, because there were not enough qualified Ruthenian teachers, – however at the same time the qualification of the Czech educators was very low, sometimes this profession was filled by simple musicians.
Economical Exploitation of Subcarpathia
The economic policy of the Czechs in Subcarpathia was characterized by the total abuse of economy and agriculture. The Czechs gave permission to the French capital investor Latorica to exploit the Carpathian forests, the largest natural treasure of this region, for forty years, by leasing him the Schönborn-Buchheim forest property, which the state expropriated and nationalized without restitution. Naturally, the Latorica cut only down the forest, but didn’t take the trouble to replant the deforested territories. Because of this the devastated Carpathian mountainsides were threatened to become totally karstic. (The Soviet Union is pursuing the same economic policy at the present.)
The total territory of Subcarpathia consists of 1,265,301 hectares of which only 220,203 hectares are plough-land, mostly of inferior quality. Therefore the agriculture of Subcarpathia would have needed the help of the state in any case to raise its output. Contrary to this the following happened, the agriculturally much more developed Czech and Moravian provinces received a support of one milliard (billion) Czech coronas for the cultivation of their agriculture from the state budget of 1928, and Subcarpathia which is only five times smaller in territory, received 150 times less for the same purpose, that is, only 3.8 million Czech coronas. (Mikhael Yuhasz, Wilson’s Principles, p. 49 and 55)
Because of the poverty of its land the main source of income for the Ruthenian mountain population was the seasonal agricultural work done on the Hungarian Great Plain, especially at the time of harvest for which work they were paid in kind, which covered the entire food requirements of the Ruthenian families during the winter. After the borders of Trianon were drawn, the Czech regime prevented the Ruthenian population of Subcarpathia to take part in the Hungarian seasonal work, but at the same time it did not ensure the sustenance of the population by opening up other working possibilities. This way the mountain population sank into utmost poverty, it was starving, and because of malnutrition the people died of the most diverse illnesses. In 1932, to investigate the complaints received by the League of Nations, an international committee arrived in Subcarpathia. This committee confirmed in its report that the people of Subcarpathia live in the greatest poverty and the level of starvation in Subcarpathia is not at all different from the famines which devastate India and China from time to time. Macartney states, in his already mentioned book, in the paragraph about the economic situation of Subcarpathia, that the standard of living of the Sub-Carpathian people became much lower than it was in the times before 1918. This decrease and impoverishment can be explained only in part with the economic crisis of the whole Central European region, because the misery of Subcarpathia is more than seasonal. According to the author of the cited book a change of the economic situation cannot be expected as long as the artificial political borders of 1918 remain and the Czech regime pursues a foreign trade policy which undermines the economic situation of this region. (Macartney, Hungary and her Successors, p. 237/38.)
Subcarpathia returns to Hungary
The territory of Subcarpathia, torn from the body of Hungary by the peace treaty of Trianon, was not limited to the regions of the southern slopes of the Carpathian Mountains with a majority of Ruthenian population, but to the South, down to the River Tisza, it also included a wide strip of land, where almost exclusively Hungarians were living. This strip of plain land, inhabited by Hungarians was annexed to Czechoslovakia that is to Subcarpathia because of strategic reasons. Without this 20 – 50 km wide Hungarian strip Czechoslovakia would not have had direct railroad connection neither to Subcarpathia, nor to Rumania, that is the military and economic circle formed around Hungary would not have been complete. With this double circle – military and economic, – they wanted to force Hungary to refrain from pursuing reparations for the injustices committed by the peace treaty of Trianon, or if this could not be accomplished, they were at least able to keep Hungary constantly at bay. Consequently Subcarpathia was a vital link of the Trianon loot which the policy of the Little-Entente wanted to keep by all means and therefore, ultimately, pushing the entire Central European region into the greatest catastrophe. On the other hand the expanded Subcarpathia was a bridge prepared for every pan-Slavic imperialist aspiration. The Soviet-Russian imperialism set foot into this region in the mid-thirties for the first time, when, within the scope of the Czech-Soviet military alliance, the Soviets received air force bases on Sub-Carpathian territory. The Soviet air force not only endangered the security of the Danube Basin and Central-Europe, but at the same time represented also a serious threat towards Poland, an ally of Western Europe. In case of war the Soviet armed forces would have had to ensure the immediate connection with these advanced posts through Poland, because the railroad built in haste by the Rumanians, leading through the Radnai Mountains, would not have been enough for the maneuver of larger Russian troops. To obtain this southern strip, giving the principle of the ethnic self-government a slap in the face, was the reason that more than 150 000 Hungarians were forced into Czechoslovakia, although, the majority of them lived in one homogenous block along the Hungarian border, located contiguously with Hungarian settled territory.
When in 1938, in connection with the question of the Sudeten-Germans, Czechoslovakia was shaken in her foundation, the Ruthenes of Subcarpathia, together with the Slovaks, considered the time appropriate to get rid of the Czech patronage and stand on their own feet. Prague was willing now to make any concessions, just to save the Czechoslovakian state from falling apart. Therefore she gave her consent to the joint decision of Ruthenian parties with Russian and Ukrainian trend, to put at the head of the Sub-Carpathian autonomous regime András Bródy, the president of the Ruthenian agricultural party (October 8, 1938). However when it came to light, that András Bródy considered as one of the first decisions of the autonomous regime, that the people of Subcarpathia should decide their destiny themselves, inclusive where they wanted to belong, and made preparations for a people’s voting, Prague, in accordance with the Ukrainian trend, relieved András Bródy from his office on October 26, and the following day, on October 27th they arrested him with the charge of high treason, and subsequently he was thrown into the Pankracz prison in Prague.
Prague then appointed titular canon Ágoston Volosin, the leader of the Ukrainian line, to the office of minister president of Subcarpathia. Volosin, with the help of armed Ukrainians, the Czech gendarmerie and army suffocated every manifestation of free will and organized a fusilier guard to which the Ukrainian Sich-guard of Galicia served as the model. He appointed Ukrainians to the most important offices, and he made Ukrainian the official language of Subcarpathia. He founded the Ukrainian National Council and declared that the inhabitants of Subcarpathia are “Ukrainians”, at the same time he changed the name of Subcarpathia to “Carpatho-Ukraine”. He suppressed the Russian and Hungarian language newspapers, put to a stop the Hungarian and Ruthenian cultural societies and dissolved the political parties. However he gave free hand to the Sich-guard which – just like the Russian NKVD – dragged the Ruthenes as well as the Hungarians who didn’t consider themselves Ukrainians, from their bed in the middle of the night, and hauled them to a place, from where they never returned.
The four-power Conference of Munich (September 28, 1938), which decided the question of the Sudetes, ordered the Czechoslovakian Government to start negotiations directly with the Hungarian Government to settle the destiny of the Hungarian minority of about one million, living in Czechoslovakia. At the same time it promised, that the conference would decide the question itself if the negotiations didn’t have any results. The Hungarian-Czechoslovak negotiations in Komárom naturally didn’t lead to any conclusion, therefore Hungary asked for the resolution of the Great Powers. Four weeks after the Conference of Munich the British and French Governments didn’t take upon themselves the role of a referee, because of the pressure of the British and French public opinion, and gave the right to decide to Germany and Italy, the powers interested the most in this territory. On November 2, 1938, Ribbentrop German and Ciano Italian foreign ministers came together in Vienna to make a decision in the Hungarian-Czechoslovakian territorial dispute. The Vienna Award re-annexed to Hungary the territories with a population of Hungarian majority, which is in Subcarpathia the territory south of the Ungvár – Munkács – Beregszász line, where there lived exclusively Hungarians.
After vacating Ungvár, the Volosin-government put its seat to Huszt. With utmost hurry it prepared the constitution of the “new” state, which was accepted by the Prague Parliament on November 22, 1938. According to this, Carpatho-Ukraine is an equal member to the Czech and Slovak Federal Republics. The president, as well as the foreign policy, monetary and military affairs are under joint leadership in every federal state.
Naturally, even at this point, the Czechs wanted to give these concessions to Subcarpathia only on paper. Against the objections of Volosin, general Prchala, the leading general of the Czechoslovakian army stationed in Subcarpathia, was named Secretary of Interior of Carpatho-Ukraine, and the executive power was concentrated in his hand. How much Prague didn’t want to give up its imperialistic aim is illustrated by the fact, that on January 6, 1939, the army of general Prchala attacked Munkács to take her autocratically into its possession. This undertaking did not succeed, because the inhabitants of Munkács took up arms and forced the attackers back before the Hungarian army arrived there.
At the same time the Sich-Guard became more and more aggressive, because it felt the sympathy, financial and military support of the German Empire. In the background of this German support we have to look for the double aim of the German policy: with the enforcement of the Ukrainian trend of Subcarpathia it wanted to hinder the political conception, that with the leadership of Italy, a Catholic block be established on the eastern border of Germany, with the aim to block an expansion of the national socialist Third German Empire to the East, and within this political concept pushed for a joint Hungarian-Polish border to be realized as soon as possible. On the other hand the leadership of the German foreign policy wanted to use Subcarpathia as base of operation in its aim to create Grand-Ukraine in the interest of which a propaganda center was established in the Viennese Donausender. Naturally the Germans didn’t fight for the independence of the Ukraine, but according to Hitler’s work “Mein Kampf” they wanted to embed Ukraine into the German economic life.
These German plans explain, why the German Government protested to the Hungarian Government when Hungary wanted to re-annex Subcarpathia, creating a joint Hungarian-Polish border and at annexing the economically helpless mountainous territory, which was completely cutoff from the world. However when in consequence of the happenings of March 1939 Czechoslovakia dissolved definitively into its components and Volosin proclaimed the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine trusting in the German support, with a quick decision the Hungarian Government went into action and with a military maneuver of two days took possession of Subcarpathia with scattered opposition of the Sich-Guard. The decision of the Hungarian Government was not only influenced because of Hungarian economic, strategic and foreign interests but also by the aim to finally liberate the Rusyn (and Hungarian) people of Subcarpathia from the terror rein of a dwarf minority with foreign – Ukrainian – trend, forced upon them through outside assistance, and to lead back the Rusyn people and the eastern part of the Carpathian Mountains into the natural economic unity of the Danube Basin. With this step the Hungarian Government ensured the livelihood, economic growth, the free internal life of the Ruthenian people, the free cultivation and development of Ruthenian culture of Subcarpathia in the spirit of the ancient Hungarian political tradition within the framework of Ruthenian self-government, as the qualified delegates of the Hungarian Government and the Ruthenian people agreed in Autumn of 1918. In this manner the Hungarian government immediately wanted to heal the Ruthenian grievances of two decades, and at the same time it also wanted to liberate the territory West of the River Ung populated by Ruthenians, but when the Hungarian army advanced to the West from the Ung, it was confronted by the army of Slovakia, which put herself under German patronage the moment she was formed, and at the demand of the German government the operation had to be stopped. The reason for this was, that in the war against Poland, the Germans, by all means, wanted to ensure the advance of the German army via the double tracked railway leading through Homonna, because the Hungarian Government, already at the negotiations at Kiel, made it clear to the German political leadership, that Hungary will not allow the German army to use Hungarian territory on its march against Poland.
“The duration of the Hungarian rule until the summer of 1944 was to short, and the Hungarian regime was not able to realize its efforts in regard of economic promotion and to emphasize the special political character of Subcarpathia. But this doesn’t change the fact that the Hungarian governments from between 1939-1944 tried to rescue Subcarpathia from its deteriorated economic situation with systematic plans, and considerable sacrifices of millions of dollars, in spite of the wartime difficulties which became more and graver. Parallel to this they ensured such rights to the Rusyn population which made it possible that they could live freely according to their ethnic character, develop their peculiar culture without restrictions and the use of their language in the administration with equal rights.” (Quote from the program of the Hungarian Society of Subcarpathia, 1952.)
In April 1944, when in consequence of the war events the theatre of war reached the natural borders of the Carpathian Mountains, as in World War I and on numerous occasions during the 1000 year old history of Hungary, the strategic importance of Subcarpathia was proven again from the viewpoint of the defense of the Danube-Basin. The defense was based on the ridge of the Carpathian Mountains, and the relatively small Hungarian forces under the command of colonel-general Ferenc Farkas de Kisbarnak stood their ground to the fullest degree and could beat off the frontal offensive of the Russian army up to the end of 1944. The Hungarian military command had to withdraw the I. Hungarian Army, defending the Carpathian Mountains effectively, from its protective positions, only when the Rumanians changed sides, which had devastating consequences for the entire Central European region, because this act opened the way for the Russian armored troops to the Hungarian Plains and their advancement from the region of Temesvár to the North threatened to completely encircle the troops defending the Carpathians. (Generaloberst Vitéz Franz Farkas von Kisbarnak: Kämpfe un den Tatern-Pass, 1953.)
Subcarpathia under Russian rule
With the withdrawal of the Hungarian army defending the Carpathians the destiny of Subcarpathia was sealed. Because, not only the total hell of Russian occupation, – free looting, the dragging away of the men, the rape of women – awaited Subcarpathia, but also the incorporation into the Soviet Union. This incorporation was not only the result of measures taken exclusively by the Soviet Union, but it took place with the total cooperation of the political leadership of the “reborn” Czechoslovakian state. Benes, the Czechoslovakian regime and the Czechoslovakian Parliament handed this territory, the gate of the Danube Basin, to Moscow and not at the pressure of Moscow, as the Czechoslovakians in exile maintain today, but voluntarily and most willingly, following the Czech’s traditions of the Pan Slavic policy. Benes gave up Subcarpathia in favor of the Soviet Union already in 1943, when he abandoned his western allies, their patronage and with them the western democracy and flew to Moscow to ensure the second “liberation” of Czechoslovakia with the help of Moscow. Benes wasn’t forced by anybody to go to Moscow, he went there voluntarily and accepted also the conditions voluntarily, which Moscow laid down for the liberation and acknowledgement of Czechoslovakia’s existence. Benes didn’t yield to the order of Moscow, when he gave up Subcarpathia, but fulfilled his old program, which he bluntly reveals in his book “Ou vont les Slaves” (1947). Benes writes there, that he and his associates only asked for the territory of Subcarpathia at the peace treaty of Paris (1919-1920), so that they were able to save it for the temporarily dropped out Russian power. When the Soviets tried to run down Europe militarily for the first time (1920) and the red army threatened already Warsaw, the president of the Czechoslovakian Republic, Thomas Masaryk, welcomed Gillerson, the envoy of the Russian Red Cross. And as the paper of Kramar, the Národny Listy states in its edition of July 11, 1924, the president of the Republic announced among others: “I consider the Subcarpathian Ruthenes as a Czechoslovakian and Russian collateral, and we Czechs will hand the Ruthenes over to Soviet Russia at the first given chance. I tell you this officially, Sir, in my capacity as the president of the Republic. I authorize you, to report this to your government in Moscow.” Therefore Benes mentions rightfully in his cited book, that concerning the question of Subcarpathia Masaryk agrees completely with his policy. This policy was served through the expansion of the Pravoslav church and forced upon the Ruthenian population the Great-Russian and Ukrainian trends. One station of this policy was to hand over Subcarpathian air force basis to the Soviets within the framework of the mutual Czechoslovak-Soviet defense alliance. In the spring of 1945, the Parliament of Prague authorized the Czechoslovak Government, without any Soviet pressure, to fulfill the promises of Benes, accompanied by the cheers of Benes’ followers and the civil parties. This is how the agreement came about between the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, according to which Czechoslovakia officially gives up Subcarpathia in favor of the Soviet Union, which was done without asking the Powers of the West, and without waiting for the peace talks.
The Soviet Union, sensitive to formal matters, referred to this pact, as well as to the resolution of voluntary junction declared by the Sub-Carpathian delegation after the elections performed with Soviet methods, when she proclaimed the incorporation of Subcarpathia into the Soviet Union on June 29, 1945. She was embodied into the Ukrainian Republic as one of her local provinces, with self-government.
After the incorporation the Soviet authorities immediately ordered the Ruthenian and Hungarian masses, considered unreliable, to be interned in the Soviet Union, and in their place they settled Ukrainians from the Soviet Union. The settlement of Russian-Ukrainian masses became so immense, that in consequence the population of Munkács and Ungvár rose from 30,000 at the time of World War II to 200,000. Barely did the occupying Soviet-Russian army arrive in Subcarpathia, instantly they ordered every male between 15 and 50 to report, otherwise they would be executed. On the posters they talked about temporary labor service, but it became known soon, that the appeared persons were taken to the Soviet Union for forced labor. Both, the Hungarians and the Ruthenians were taken. The first large collecting-camp was established in Szolyva (Svalvava) and through this camp 73,000 men were dragged to the Soviet Union. The carried off people started to die already in the collecting-camp. Because of the extraordinarily weak food contagious diseases appeared, especially dysentery, which decimated them. In average there were forty deaths daily. From the 600 persons ordered to do repair work on the viaduct of Voloc only 396 persons returned after two weeks. The rest perished in consequence of hunger, sickness or freezing. The Russians pulled the shoes from the people and made them work barefooted in the snow. The drafted went on foot over the snowy and icy Carpathians from Szolyva to the collection-camps at Sanok, Stráy-Zombor and Novy-Zámbor in Galicia. At Sanok on the average 100 people died daily in consequence of typhus, para-typhus and dysentery. From these collection-camps the dragged away persons were put in closed freight cars, up to a 100 in one, and taken to various prison camps in Siberia. Sometimes they didn’t get even raw potatoes and were not allowed to drink a sip of water for days. At their arrival, their remaining clothing, still usable, was taken from them and were substituted by rags. Because there was no possibility to clean themselves, the prisoners soon became lousy which brought new illnesses onto them. The following case is typical to the conditions in the Russian prison camps: In August of 1945 Ferenc Gábor from Nagydobrony died in camp No. 9 at Tiflis. They put his body on a truck and took him to the neighboring German prison camp. There he was cut into pieces, and soap was made out of him. The case was reported by Jenő Strauss, inhabitant of Várpalánk (close to Munkács), who was assigned to help as a sanitary worker at the transport.
The author of this writing shared the bitter fate of the dragged away from Subcarpathia. This gave him the possibility to learn to know all the layers of the people of Subcarpathia, their way of feeling and thinking more closely. Talking about the future of Subcarpathia with some of his confidants, the older and younger generation alike, whether they spoke Hungarian or not, declared themselves to Hungary, because they had a chance to learn to know the Czech “democracy”, the dictatorship of Volosin and all the “blessings” of the Russian “paradise”. Therefore the author of this writing decided already then, that if he gets a chance ever again, he will dedicate his life to the liberation of Subcarpathia and its union with Hungary. On December 20, 1945, by cutting the wire which surrounded the camp he was able to escape from the camp and because of his perfect knowledge of the Russian language he arrived safely in Subcarpathia. Here they were about to hold the general elections of the Soviet Union (February 10, 1946), therefore he could also look into these. There was a double voting sheet. On top of one was the name of previous partisan leader Vászil Ruszin, on top of the other István Turjánicza. The latter started his carrier as a chicken thief and continued it as a highwayman. Because the Czech police issued a warrant against him, he fled to the Soviet Union, where he completed a course in journalism and propaganda at Kiev, and came back to Subcarpathia as a lieutenant of the Czech Legion founded in the Soviet Union, and became the leader of the Self-Government. The majority of the voters crossed out both names and 60% wrote down Hungary instead. About 30% voted for Czechoslovakia, therefore not more than a few votes remained for the official candidates. However, the paper of the local communist party wrote about a 98% victory the following day!
Considering that it was impossible for him to stay in Subcarpathia, the author of this writing fled to Hungary at the end of February 1946 and from there escaped to Austria on June 31 of the same year.
Subcarpathia in emigration (in exile)
Council for Free Subcarpathian Ruthenia. When in 1950 Czech political groups, following the footsteps of Benes and fighting for the restoration of Czech imperialism, set their eye on Subcarpathia again, they mobilized their old agent Mano Handelsmann – Emil Havas, editor and owner of the paper Új Közlöny of Ungvár, financed by the Czechs, who played a leading role at the time of the communism of 1919. Therefore in November of 1950, on behalf of the Czechs, Emil Havas visited Frederic M. Bolbeared, executive vice president of Free Europe at that time, and called his attention to the problem of Subcarpathia already falling into oblivion. A few months later, as a result of this conversation, The Council for Free Subcarpathian Ruthenia was founded with the help of Free Europe in Hamilton, Canada, and László Fedinec, ex-director of the Podkarpatski Bank, was elected as president and as Vice-president Dr. Emil Klima. The latter is not even a Ruthenian but a former Czech administrative official settled in Subcarpathia. The first assignment of the Council was to announce its collaboration with the Czechs in exile, and to pledge the reestablishment of Czechoslovakia.
After that they sent a carefully composed memorandum to Free Europe, in which they outlined their program and submitted their requests. Very slyly, at the top of their requests they put the broadcasting of Greek Catholic services to Subcarpathia through Radio Free Europe – naturally within the Czech program, because they wanted to ensure the friendly support of the Greek Catholic Church of Pittsburgh, which plays an extremely important role in the development of the American Ruthenian public opinion. We are sorry to say, that the leaders of the Greek-Catholic Church did not recognize the transparent political move, and with the leadership of bishop Iváncsó, they offered their cooperation with the utmost readiness. Immediately bishop Daniel Ivancso assigned dr. Basil Sereghi, professor of the Pittsburgh Seminary, who, as it happens, studied theology in Budapest and was commonly known already then for his anti-Hungarian disposition, as the one in charge of this matter. The attitude of bishop Iváncsó is all the more regrettable, because not only the Ruthenian Greek Catholic parishes belong under his leadership, but also the Hungarian Greek Catholic parishes. Ultimately the institution which was kept up partially by the Hungarian faithful, was in the service of the anti-Hungarian Czech policy. This was done to please those Czechs, who in one of their publications in French bragged, that after short ten years of the independent Czech state’s existence, they could increase the number of nonsectarians from barely a few per mille in 1918 to over 5% and who played such a decisive role in the cultural fight against the Sub-Carpathian Greek Catholic Church and the spread of pravoslavism by all means possible. This is done because of the activities of Emil Havas, of whom Michael Yuhasz Sr. states in his work Wilson’s Principles in Czechoslovak Practice: “former ardent communist” (p. 13).
When on July 4, 1952 the Free Czechoslovakian Council (New York) was formed, they announced in their advertised program, that they consider Subcarpathia as an integral part of Czechoslovakia and they lay claim to it, because only the “Russian force” robbed it from Czechoslovakia. We saw already, that this Czech explication is opposite to the historical facts. Naturally the Czech propaganda understands how the facts can be distorted and the uninformed western public opinion mislead. To refute the deceiving assertion of the Czech propaganda, nothing else would have to be done but to hand over the book of Benes “Ou vont les Slaves” to the western politicians, which contains the belief of Benes in panslavism and its Russian-Bolshevik version of today.
To strengthen the Czech claims they invited representatives of the Council for Free Subcarpathian Ruthenia created by them into the Free Czechoslovakian Council, respectively into its executive Committee. The president of the Council for Free Subcarpathian Ruthenia, Vasily Fedinec became a member of the latter, while Dr. Emil Klima, Gábor Sarkanich, Dr. Lajos Gálán and V. Symkanich became members of the Free Czechoslovakian Council.
Emil Havas stayed in the background, but worked all the more effectively. At the end of 1952 he sent an open letter to the president of Radio Free Europe to press for the compliance of the demands contained in the Ruthenian memorandum. His intervention brought results and in spring of this year (1953? the translator) Radio Free Europe started to broadcast a Greek Catholic mass on Sundays.
The Ukrainian claims. Subcarpathia is not only claimed by the Czechs, but also by the Ukrainians, who in this regard refer to historical and ethnic rights. We know, that this has no foundation at all. In Subcarpathia the propaganda with Ukrainian trend was started through the support of the Czech government around 1924, and although a part of the Ruthenian middle class was won successfully for this concept, the majority of the Ruthenian people remained Ruthenian and didn’t deviate from the traditions formed during the centuries: it preserved its original ethnic identity. The basis of the historical right to the Ukrainian claim is the terror regime of Volosin lasting a few months and its ethnic pretext is the declaration of the Ukrainian National Council, founded by the Volosin regime, that the people of Subcarpathia is “Ukrainian”.
The Ukrainians in exile follow a completely wrong path, by believing, that in case Russia will be crushed, which will definitely happen, the moment will come, when all Ukrainian national ambitions will be fulfilled, without taking into consideration the vital interests of the neighboring people. The Ukrainians in exile dream of the creation of a Large-Ukraine, which expands from the river Don to the river Tisza. This new state would trample down territories populated by Rumanians, would cross the line of the Carpathians, so that, after the dropping out of Moscow, Kiev could head the grand Slavic ambitions, as the heir to Moscow’s South-East European and Balkan policy. The political leadership of the Ukrainians in exile doesn’t make it a secret, that it claims Subcarpathia for Grand-Ukraine, neither of the fact, that beyond the Subcarpathian territory annexed presently to Soviet-Ukraine, it demands the western territories populated by Ruthenes together with Kassa, as this was announced by them in the official memorandum of The Ukrainian National Council handed to the Hungarian National Committee. We simply are confronted with Ukrainian imperialism, which is not only a political and military threat to the whole Danube Basin, but it threatens also to annihilate our Ruthenian people. Like the Czechs, they also want to rule over us against our will without asking us.
The Ukrainians have their Sub-Carpathian clique, which consists mainly of the participants of the tragic Volosin rule of four and a half month. Among them are J. Revay, a minister of Volosin, professor Stefán, Dr. Chyminecz, Dr. Shandor, Dr. Komarynsky, Dr. Laszlo Veress, Miklós Vajda, Macola Simon and János Puja. This Sub-Carpathian ensemble started a paper named Karpatska Zorja, and it is maintained by members of the Ukrainian Church, as the Ukrainian bishops Ambrosius Szenisin of Philadelphia, Nil Szavarin of Edmonton, Izidor Boreczki of Toronto and Kir Maxim Hermanyuk of Winnipeg. Toward the American Ruthenes they present themselves in Ruthenian disguise, but at the same time they praise the Ukrainians and tell the old-American Ruthenes that the Ruthenian denomination is an outdated designation today, because the Ruthenes are called Ukrainians currently. The naive, uninformed Ruthenes, who didn’t experience the events of the homeland believe mostly this propaganda, because their own clergy is telling them this.
Hungarian Association of Subcarpathia
By describing the situation of Subcarpathia in exile the Hungarian Association of Subcarpathia has to be mentioned separately, and the following points of its program, formulated by Károly Hokky former Sub-Carpathian delegate and senator, have to be emphasized.
The aim of the Hungarian Association of Subcarpathia is “to inform the free western people of the dangers, which threaten the peace and security of Europe through the fact, that Benes played Subcarpathia into the hands of Moscow and through this deed the communist Russian imperialism, which wants to conquer the West, could get a foothold on the western slopes of the Carpathians. – There has to be fought for with all means, that in the course of the future’s territorial and political settlement Subcarpathia should return into the political community of the people living in the Danube-Basin, surrounded by the Carpathians, where she belongs according to her historical, geopolitical and economical makings, from where she was uprooted by force and against the will of the population in 1919. Already now, while in exile the basic principles of such a constitutional settlement should be prepared according to which, after liberation the people of Subcarpathia: Hungarians, Ruthenes, Germans and Rumanians should be ensured of all the rights on the basis of total equal rights which regulate the peaceful coexistence of the natives in religious, political, and administrative respect. – To realize the goals of common interests, as well as to work together most closely with the exile organizations of the friendly Ruthenian people, which have similar goals, and establish the requirements in the interest of a harmonious coexistence.”
The freedom movement of the Subcarpathian Ruthenes
The political and military importance of Subcarpathia’s geographical location makes it understandable, that the political battle for the territory of Subcarpathia already began between the exiles. With exception of the Hungarian expatriates neither the Czechs nor the Ukrainians have the serious intention to help the Ruthenian people of Subcarpathia, to ensure their interests or even their existence. The time came, that Subcarpathia’s Ruthenian people themselves had to organize their own political body, the Liberation Movement of the Subcarpathian Ruthenes, to prepare the deliverance of the Ruthenian People, to ensure their right to self-government, because we have to hinder in any case that a decision is made about us without us. Therefore we demand the right to the people’s self-determination, namely its application in the real sense, which is that the people of Subcarpathia, or rather the natives of Subcarpathia should decide about their own destiny and their affiliation. This resolution cannot be falsified with the “proclamation”, or “pact” of a political group or organization created by some bought off agents. However neither have those immigrants of Sub-Carpathian origin the right to determine the fate of Subcarpathia, who are already American or Canadian citizens, but who have no intention at all to return to Subcarpathia. The people of Subcarpathia have to determine their destiny in Subcarpathia. Following the example of Saarland’s popular elections of 1934, neither will be those allowed to take part in the decision, who were settled in Subcarpathia by foreign forces for reasons to change the folk character and ethnic composition artificially. That is, neither the Czech, nor the Russian, respectively Ukrainian settlers will be allowed to vote. Only those, who lived in this region before November 1st, 1918, or the descendants of the same.
Deducting from the sad events of the times between 1918 to 1939 and those following 1944, we are distrustful to the highest degree in regard to the Czech, Ukrainian and Russian policy and their agents, and because it is clear to us, that Subcarpathia, – especially if it is limited to the mountainous region inhabited by the Ruthenian majority – is incapable of living by itself, we want to return into the boundaries of the Hungarian State, into the natural economic unity of the Danube Basin, because only this way is it possible to guarantee the economic interests of our people, its work prospect and the increase of its standard of living. We wish this all the more, because in the time between 1939 to 1944 the Hungarian Government and the Hungarian people gave testimony that instead of plundering the Ruthenian people, it wishes to embrace it and assure them beside complete equality with the Hungarians those special rights, which make it possible to freely develop and promote the ethnic culture of the Ruthenes. We desire this in the spirit of our Ruthenian people’s historical traditions, according to the explicit standpoint of the Ruthenian National Council of Ungvár, and we believe, that at last the politicians of the West will fulfill their promises made during the past two World Wars, will comply with the principle of self-determination and the right to freedom for the small nations. According to this we urge on our part, that during the future organization the ethnic principle should be the norm, and this way we want to liberate not only the Ruthenes living on the territory of present day Subcarpathia, but we want to liberate all Ruthenes, that they can participate as a united whole in the union of the Danubian nations within the Hungarian State of St. Stephen.
This RUSYN MEMORANDUM was written around 1953.
The original Rusyn Memorandum written in Hungarian was published in the periodical Szittyakürt in the January and February issue of 1987.
Translated by Emese Kerkay
(The author of this memorandum, vitéz Mihály Pazuhánics-Páncélos was born in Munkács, Bereg County, Subcarpathia, Hungary in 1912, and deceased in 1987, North Olmsted, USA). He was a highly educated Rusyn/Ruthene, and a master of the Hungarian language. By profession he was a police officer and writer.)